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David Howarth"
Consider the second edition of a book which has exercised great influ-
ence upon the discussion of fundamental questions of law and philosophy.
Causation in the Law, by H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honor6, first published
in 1959, has reappeared to haunt a new generation of scholars.' It is a
truly formidable work, setting standards of scholarship and insight in a
field notorious for its difficulty, standards which have not been, and prob-
ably never will be, surpassed. Nevertheless, the first edition of the book
has generated a good deal of critical comment over the last quarter cen-
tury. 2 Courts on both sides of the Atlantic have meanwhile yielded a de-
* Formerly Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford, England.
** Regius Professor, Oxford, England.
t Fellow, Clare College, Cambridge, England.
1. H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter CAUSA-
TION; references are to second edition unless otherwise stated].
2. See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP & A. ROSENBERG, HUME AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION
288-300 (1981) (discussing Hart & Honors's implications for Hume); A. BEcrr & F. MILLER, THE
TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES 153-223 (1961) (dis-
puting Hart & Honor6's insistence on role of normative judgments in causation); A. HARARI, THE
PLACE OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 50-56 (1962) (arguing causation cannot be treated as
distinct issue from negligence); R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 87-117 (1963);
H. McGREGOR, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 71-72 (1980); J. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNI-
VERSE 44-48, 117-36 (paperback ed. 1980); A. PECZENIK, CAUSES AND DAMAGES 186-87 (1979)
(agreeing with much of Hart & Honor6 while accepting strong version of causation rejected by them);
H. SmTREr, LAW OF TORTS 142 (6th ed. 1976) (Hart and HonorE "take[] insufficient account of the
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cent crop of puzzling, and sometimes bizarre, cases.' Hart and Honor6
therefore had plenty of scope for revision, rejoinder, and new reflection.
This review aims to assess these new contributions in light of the debate
on causation as it now stands.
After placing the causation debate in a wider context, I shall move on
to a recapitulation of the essentials of Hart and Honor6's thesis and a
review of some fundamental objections to it. Thereafter, by way of a run-
ning commentary rather than a structured argument, I look at their at-
tempt, new to the second edition, to specify the relationship between
causal and non-causal issues in the law.
blending of questions of causality and policy in judicial decisions"); Cole, Windfall and Probability.
A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law (pt. 1), 52 CALIF. L. REV. 459, 466-71 (1964) (criticizing
Hart & Honor6's emphasis on "common-sense notions"); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151, 181-84 (1973) (criticizing Hart & Honor6's view of intentional, intervening acts);
Fleming, The Passing of Polemis, 39 CAN. B. REV. 489, 509 n.70 (1961) (assailing lack of legal
realist viewpoint in Hart & HonorE); Gorovitz, Causal Judgments and Causal Explanations, 62 J.
PHIL. 695, 698-700 (1965) (suggesting minor refinement to Hart & Honor6 thesis); Green, The
Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 565-69 (1962) (admitting useful-
ness of Hart & Honor8 analysis, but claiming much of it not about causation); Mansfield, Hart and
Honori, Causation in the Law-A Comment, 17 VAND. L. REV. 487 (1964); Williams, Causation in
the Law, 1961 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 62 (1961) (discussing first edition of CAUSATION in light of judicial
support for foreseeability test); Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735 (1985)
(criticizing Hart & Honor's analysis on numerous grounds); Boberg, Book Review, 78 S. AFR. L.J.
120 (1961) (praising Hart & Honor6's thoroughness); Brett, Book Review, 3 MELB. U.L. REV. 93,
95-96 (1961) (criticizing Hart and Honor's refusal to say a case is wrongly decided); Childres,
Recent Book, 32 Miss. L.J. 222 (1960-1961) (Causation a "monumental" work); Cooperrider, Re-
cent Book, 58 MICH. L. REV. 951 (1960) (noting intuitive appeal of Causation's approach); Coutts,
Book Review, 23 MOD. L. REV. 708 (1960) (calling Causation "brilliant"); De Wet, Book Review,
1962 AcTA JURIDICA (University of Cape Town) 139 (arguing much of Hart & Honor 's approach
is tautological); Hancock, Book Review, 6 NAT. L.F. 143 (1961) (presenting minor quibbles in gener-
ally favorable review); Leflar, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1691, 1693-94 (1962) (generally
criticizing analyses, including Hart and Honori's, that insist on determinative causation models);
Nokes, Book Review, 9 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 353 (1960) (praising Causation's argument while criti-
cizing its style); White, Book Review, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1058 (1960) (Hart and Honor6 "bril-
liantly" discuss causation); Tune, 1956 D.S. Jur. 354, 355 (note) (citing Hart and HonorE articles
published before Causation, 1st ed.).
In view of the length and breadth of this list, consider the following comment: "Hart's and Ho-
nor6's important work on causation. . . despite the elegance and persuasiveness of [its] analysis...
has had no discernible influence on contemporary tort theorists . Borgo, Causal Paradigms in
Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 425 n.17 (1979).
3. See, e.g., Baker v. Willoughby, 1970 A.C. 467; Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., 1970 A.C.
1004; see also Perl v. Camden L.B.C., [1984] 1 Q.B. 342; Jobling v. Associated Dairies Ltd., [1981] 2
All E.R. 752 (H.L.); McGhee v. National Coal Bd., [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1; McWilliams v. Sir William
Arrol & Co., [1962] 1 W.L.R. 295; Meihost v. Meihost, 29 Wis. 2d 537, 139 N.W.2d 116 (1966); cf.
Davis v. Thornton, 384 Mich. 138, 180 N.W.2d 11 (1970); Regina v. Blaue, [1975] 3 All E.R. 446;
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980); Tremain v.
Pike, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1303; Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., 1961 A.C. 388
(The Wagon Mound No. 1); Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co., [1967] 1 A.C. 617
(The Wagon Mound No. 2). For an example from the other side of the Pacific, see Boyd v. State
Gov't Ins. Office, 1978 Q.R. 195; see also Government of Papua New Guinea v. Moini, 53 AUSTL
L.J. 19 (1979) (case comment).
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I. THE POLITICS OF CAUSATION
Before taking up in some detail the criticisms of Causation in the Law,
together with Hart and Honort's responses, I should address a larger
question. Why should anyone care about such an esoteric subject? Or
what, if anything, is at stake in the seemingly endless war by hypothetical
that has now developed?
One's views on causation, one's views on how the law in a specific area
(usually torts) ought to look, and one's general political, moral, and philo-
sophical commitments used to have very little to do with one another.
There was some logic to the distribution of views, but it was more cul-
tural than political. Leon Green and his followers were classical American
realists. Their views on causation and torts were based on fairly clear
principles. They had no faith in the power of rules or other verbal formu-
lations to restrain the judiciary or to achieve justice." They did believe,
however, that institutions-especially the courts as a combination of judge
and jury-could achieve something like justice, if only they avoided rigid
thinking and faced difficult decisions with candor and a clear head. Hart
and Honor6, by contrast, but in common with much of English legal
thinking this century, had much more faith in words than in courts. Un-
controlled judicial discretion was greatly to be feared,5 and though to some
extent inevitable, it could be minimized by carefully drafted verbal rules.
As for social policy, it was clearly beyond the capabilities, and the juris-
diction, of the courts.' Although to an American these views would have
sounded conservative, and indeed Hart and Honor's methods and conclu-
sions are conservative, their approach had as much resonance on the left
of British politics as on the right.'
The connection between legal views and political views has become de-
cidedly firmer since Richard Epstein started to expound his views in
1973.1 Put very crudely, Epstein advocates a system of strict liability
based almost entirely on a concept of "causing harm." For this project to
4. See, e.g., Green, supra note 2, at 568 (although no one would agree with merely "intuitive"
judgments from judges, the influences that in fact prevent this are not all "rules"). "I think it safe to
say that no rule or formula can be written that can ever be depended upon to supersede the power of
enlightened judges to meet the responsibility that the environment in its totality imposes upon a
court." Id.
5. CAUSATION at 4-5, 292, 298, 436.
6. Id. at 285.
7. See generally J. GRIFFITH, POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 52 (1977) (stating conventional view
of British left-that judiciary, and thus law itself, is hopelessly biased in favor of rich and powerful).
For Hart's political views ("social democratic"), see N. MACOORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981).
8. See Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477
(1979) [hereinafter Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice]; Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979) [hereinafter Epstein, Nuisance
Law]; Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent
Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, supra note 2.
1391
The Yale Law Journal
work, Epstein needs not only a justifiable model of rights to define
"harm" but also a strong and coherent notion of causation. Although he
makes a plausible claim to have drawn inspiration from Hart and
Honor6, Epstein's view that causation is determinative of all the relevant
issues ("causal maximalism") receives little sympathy from them in the
Preface to the second edition of Causation in the Law.9 They give him
credit only for making some telling points against the risk theorists10 and
the new champions of "causal minimalism," the economists.,
"Causal minimalism" is the view that there is nothing, or virtually
nothing, of importance in causal issues. The extreme view, favored by
some economists,1 2 is that the defendant and plaintiff are usually equally
"responsible" in a but-for cause sense (if the plaintiff had not been on the
road, the defendant would not have run into her), and so causation is
usually of no consequence. Once the defendant's conduct is established as
a but-for cause, all other issues are about the distribution of costs. Guido
Calabresi' gives more attention than other economists to causation, but
Hart and Honors classify him as a "minimalist" as well. Apart from but-
for cause, his analysis concerns extreme probability (his "causal link"),
which Hart and Honors deny is causal,14 or else proximate cause, which
turns out to be a matter of assigning responsibilities in furtherance of a
range of policies.
1 5
In contrast to Hart and Honor6, Epstein has no particular desire to
describe the law as it is. 16 If the courts do not follow his theory, then his
reply is that they should. More importantly, his views are explicitly
founded on a political philosophy which might properly be called a form
of libertarianism. 17 The tenet of this philosophy apparently most relevant
9. CAUSATION at lxxiii-lxxvii.
10. The "risk theory" is the idea that liability should extend as far, but only as far, as claims for
types of harm of which the chance or risk constituted either the reason or a reason for the imposition
of liability. See generally James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951); Seavey, Principles
of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REv. 72, 90-93 (1942).
11. As for Epstein's particular account of causation, Hart and Honor6 reject it as "crude and
inflexible." CAUSATION at lxxvii. Indeed even, or perhaps especially, among supporters of Epstein's
project there is dissatisfaction with his approach to the causation question. Much of the best work
now being carried out on the technicalities of causation is being done by those who are motivated by a
desire to save the Epstein project. Wright, supra note 2, at 1827-28, clearly falls into this category.
12. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 37 (1960).
13. See, e.g., Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHs. L. REv. 69 (1975).
14. See infra text accompanying note 37.
15. CAUSATION at lxxii-lxxiii.
16. But, as Posner says, Epstein at least creates the impression that his theory has merit as a
description. Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory. A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 457 n.1 (1979). What
Epstein describes, however, is certainly not the positive law of England, nor of any Western European
state that I know.
17. See Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice, supra note 8, at 488-90, 497. He does claim
not to be an uncompromising libertarian, id. at 490, but the subtleties of this pronouncement are hard
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to the law of torts is that the law, and the state in general, has no business
trying to establish or maintain any particular distribution of benefits and
burdens in society."8 The only sort of justice in which the state should
deal is "corrective justice"-a concept Epstein claims to borrow from Ar-
istotle.19 Corrective justice is backward-looking and aims only to restore
the previous balance between the parties. This is in contrast, and is sup-
posed to be incompatible, with the "forward-looking" approach of the
economists who want the law to take into account both its potential deter-
rent effects on people not involved in the suit at hand and its general
effects on the allocation of resources. Epstein thus differs from those, such
as Dean Calabresi, who openly acknowledge the place of both deterrence
and distributive justice in their thinking about torts in general and causa-
tion in particular.20
The faint praise Hart and Honor6 give to Epstein2 makes it clear that
they do not share his reductionist view of justice. If one combines Hart
and Honor6's apparent moderation with their view that the courts are not
very good at social policy, then one can conclude that they hold the com-
monplace British opinion that the courts are for rectificatory justice while
Parliament is for distributive justice. In Britain, unlike the United States,
the distributive branch is supreme.2
to comprehend.
18. Id. at 488; see also Borgo, supra note 2, at 452 n.51 (defining "social value" as willingness to
pay). But see Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice, supra note 8, at 497 n.63 (making some
concession to legislative activity).
19. "The traditional 'corrective' is unfortunate, because it suggests moral correction, whereas the
object of this kind of justice is merely adjustment." THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 179 n.2 (J.A.K.
Thomson & H. Tredennick trans. rev. ed. 1976) [hereinafter ETHICS]. This term is usually translated
as "rectificatory" justice these days.
20. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 13; Borgo, supra note 2, at 454.
21. "[T]ort cannot be accounted for solely as [a forward-looking instrument]. Backward-looking
aims . . . play at least some part in it . . . ." CAUSATION at lxxv (emphasis added).
22. Before leaving this topic two things should be noted. As Posner, and Hart and Honor6, point
out, Aristotle's rectificatory justice was based on fault, not strict liability. Posner, The Concept of
Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 189-92 (1981); CAUSA-
TION at lxxv. In any case, for Aristotle rectificatory justice presupposed distributive justice. That is,
although according to Aristotle distributive justice does not require absolute equality, and it is there-
fore possible for a transaction between unequals to be just, it is not possible to have a just transaction
in an unjust society:
Political justice obtains between those who share a life for the satisfaction of their needs as
persons free and equal, either [absolutely or relative to their value as citizens]. Hence in as-
sociations where these conditions are not present there is no political justice between the mem-
bers, but only a sort of approximation to justice.
ETHICS, supra note 19, at 188 (1134a23-b8), (footnote incorporated into text). The reconciliation in
real social institutions of distributive and rectificatory justice is, admittedly, difficult. But, reducing
one to the other merely creates worse problems. How can a society in which great distributional
inequality persists, albeit from supposedly "unforced" transactions, be called "just"? Similarly, what
is "just" about a society in which some people can renege on promises, fail to carry out duties and
generally do harm to others?
For one solution of some authority, see Leviticus 25:6, 10, 39-55 (prescribing roles for treatment of
servants in discussion of "jubilee"); see also J. YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS (1972) (drawing on
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The technical debates about causation therefore have taken on a new
meaning. It is important to know how much weight the best possible cau-
sation model will bear. Can it support the whole of the law of obligations
by itself, Atlas-like, in which case the Epstein project remains plausible?
Or is its strength wholly illusory, a matter of smoke and mirrors which it
is necessary to see through in order to see what really holds up the legal
edifice? Hart and Honor6 believe that both of these positions are false.
But in order to say whether we should concur with them, we have to
subject their model of causation to the most rigorous scrutiny. This means
engaging fully in the technical debates themselves.
II. COMMON SENSE AND CAUSATION: A RECAPITULATION
As several reviewers of the first edition of Causation in the Law re-
marked,"3 there is far too much in the book, indeed in each sentence, for
any pr&is to be adequate. All I intend to do in this section is provide a
Few reminders of some of its main themes. The overall structure of the
first edition has been retained in the second, and so for the most part I
shall postpone discussion of the differences between the two until later.
The most insistent of the book's themes is that certain views seriously
underestimate the autonomy and importance of causal argument in law.24
In general, these theories hold that the only truly causal question relevant
in law is: "Would the harm of which the plaintiff complains have oc-
curred if the defendant had acted lawfully?" '25 (or, a different test,
"Would the harm have occurred but for the defendant's conduct?" 28 ). All
other questions that are sometimes couched in causal terms, for example
"proximate cause" or "remoteness," are, according to these views, in real-
ity matters of legal policy: Was the harm within the risk envisaged by the
legal rule?27 Should the law recognize that this sort of defendant owed a
duty to this sort of plaintiff?28 Should the defendant be liable for this sort
of harm?2 1 Would the harm have been foreseeable for reasonable peo-
ple?30 Some writers, especially those who formulated the cause-in-fact
A. TROCME, JESUS-CHRIST ET LA REvOLUTION NON-VIOLANTE (1961)).
23. See, e.g., Childres, supra note 2, at 222-23; Green, supra note 2, at 543-44.
24. CAUSATION at xxxiv-xxxv, lxvii-lxxviii.
25. See, e.g., A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 2, at 179 (criticizing Hart & Honor6 for not
dealing with "negligent segment" of defendant's conduct). See generally id. at 171-86; Wright, supra
note 2, at 1766-74.
26. See, e.g., Green, supra note 2, at 549 n.11. Note also the discussion of the similar problem in
German theory of "elimination with substitution" versus "simple elimination." CAUSATION at 453
n.34.
27. CAUSATION at 6, 13, 265, 284-90.
28. See, e.g., Green, supra note 2, at 546, 548.
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question in terms of whether the damage would have occurred if the de-
fendant had acted lawfully, even doubted whether any causal questions
could be asked free of policy, or at least normative, considerations. 3 '
Although they admit that these theories do have some advantages, for
example making explicit the importance of the scope of particular rules,
Hart and Honor6 have one central objection to them. To accept theories
of causation requiring only but-for cause is, they claim, to commit oneself
to a usage of the word "cause," both as a verb and as a noun, that does
not correspond to ordinary usage, indeed that strains ordinary usage to an
unacceptable degree. Even if legal analysis requires a language more re-
fined than the everyday, it should start with and constantly refer back to
ordinary usage. 2
A. Basis and Departure from Hume and Mill
Hart and Honors's own account of causal language, which they claim
approximates "common sense" and ordinary usage, both in the law and
outside, starts out, anomalously perhaps, from the work of two philoso-
phers, David Hume and John Stuart Mill.33 They accept Mill's doctrine,
which derives from Hume, that particular causal statements such as "X
caused Y" are not only supported by general statements about a rule-like
sequential relationship between X's and Y's, but also imply them. That is,
it makes no sense to say "X caused Y" when one cannot point to a true
general rule that "X's are followed by Y's." Furthermore, Hart and Ho-
nor6 agree with Mill that the best way to approach these relationships is
in terms of complex sets of conditions being jointly sufficient for a result,
rather than in terms of necessity or sufficiency of each condition consid-
ered separately. For Mill, what "causes" an event is the whole set of con-
ditions that as a combination is sufficient for its occurrence, not just the
event that immediately preceded it. "Necessity" in the first instance is a
matter of the relationship between one condition and the complex and
sufficient set of conditions. 34 A condition is necessary if without it the
whole set of conditions present would cease to be sufficient. Lastly, they
accept Mill's doctrine of the plurality of causes, which says that distinct
sets of conditions may be sufficient for the same result, both on a particu-
lar occasion and in general.
Hart and Honors depart, however, from Mill at several crucial
31. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2; Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60
(1956). See generally Wright, supra note 2, at 1738-39, 1742-45 (reviewing Malone, supra).
32. CAUSATION at xxxiv, 1-4.
33. Id. at 12-25.
34. Id. at 112-13; see Wright, supra note 2, at 1789.
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points. 5 First, they consider Mill's requirement that a causal regularity
must be "invariable and unconditional" to be too strict to support a par-
ticular causal statement.3 6 They emphasize that if one is seeking an expla-
nation for an event that has already occurred, which is usually the case in
law, as opposed to predicting future events, one is relieved of the need for
absolute certainty about the results of the conjunction of the events in
question. Ex hypothesi it resulted in the event one seeks to explain. There-
fore, claim Hart and Honor6, one does not require generalizations about
the precise set of circumstances as a set. An explanation is complete even
if the set is broken down into a sequence of discrete events each of which
exemplifies a broad generalization. For example, if someone drops a brick
from a building and injures a passerby, one need not have been able to
predict the injury in advance to be in a position to say that the injury was
caused by someone dropping a brick. It is not necessary to show that
whenever bricks are dropped in these circumstances, injuries ensue. It suf-
fices to point to the generalizations that things fall when they are dropped,
and that a heavy object falling from a sufficient height will cause injury if
it hits someone. These generalizations are, of course, trite and platitudi-
nous-they go without saying. As Hart and HonorE would say, they are a
matter of common sense.
Note, however, that Hart and Honor6 would not accept generalizations
in the form of statements of probability, such as "a short circuit very fre-
quently causes fire." This means only that on a number of particular oc-
casions short circuits have caused fires. It is not inconsistent with a short
circuit not causing a fire on another particular occasion. We are commit-
ted only to the possibility that short circuits cause fires, not to the asser-
tion that they do. If we were otherwise committed, in every case where a
short circuit was not followed by a fire, we would have to offer a specific
explanation distinguishing this case from others in order to preserve the
generalization.3"
In one case Hart and Honor6 reject the need to show a general causal
regularity altogether. This is where we are concerned not with physical
events but "interpersonal transactions," where the words or deeds of one
person are said to cause another person to act or to result in the actions of
another person. This occurs, for example, where X "induces" or "per-
suades" or "forces" Y to do something. 8 They argue that we accept state-
ments like "Y did A because of threats by X," or "because of the reasons
put forward by X," even though we know that, on another occasion under
35. CAUSATION at 22-25.
36. Id. at 28-32.
37. Id. at 48-49.
38. Id. at 51-59, 187-94 (wrongful acts).
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identical conditions, Y might act differently. Hart and Honor6 could again
say that since explanation is different from prediction, one needs only
broad generalizations; one need not look at the whole set of circumstances,
but instead could reduce what one sought to explain to a sequence of
events. But here this move does not work. Certainly, one can "under-
stand" people acting for a particular reason, in the sense that if they had
not believed in or accepted the reason they would have acted differently.
The problem is that one can also conceive of the same people in the same
circumstances believing in the reason, but deciding not to act on it. One
might describe such conduct as "irrational," but the possibility of it hap-
pening cannot be ruled out-unlike, for example, the possibility of a
dropped brick not falling. Therefore, even "broad" generalizations are not
possible. In other words, human consciousness and choice, although often
constrained, cannot be reduced to causal laws.
In a similar way, when we speak of X providing Y with an opportu-
nity 9 to do A, or robbing Y of the opportunity to do B, we need not
believe that such opportunities are invariably taken. In this case Hart and
Honor6 for once admit the relevance of statements of likelihood ("people
often do A in these circumstances") and even of common morality ("it was
proper of X to do A even though it gave Y the opportunity to do B") in
making "purely" causal judgments. An example of the relevance of likeli-
hood is: you fail to deliver machinery to me. I lose profits. You say that
you did not cause the loss because I might have failed to make a profit in
any case (through bad marketing, for instance). Hart and Honor6 say that
I may reply that in normal circumstances I would make a profit and so
you have caused a loss."° The relevance of common morality can be seen
in the next two cases. First, X burgles Y's office. X got in through a door
unlocked by Z because of fire regulations. Second, P burgles Q's house,
having got in through a door that was left open by R, the housekeeper, to
let a cat in and out of the house. Hart and Honor6's point is that whether
Z or R were justified in leaving the doors open is relevant to whether Z or
R caused the loss to Y or Q.
Hart and Honor6's most important departure from Mill is their refusal
to follow him, in his strict or "scientific" theory, in restricting the use of
"'cause" to the complete set of "conditions" that are jointly sufficient for
the result. In the name of ordinary usage they go even further, rejecting
Mill's account of a "popular" theory of causation. It turns out that Mill's
account is the same as the traditional academic legal orthodoxy, according
39. Id. at 59-61, 158-59, 194-200. The treatment of depriving others of opportunities has been
expanded in the second edition. See id. at xxxiv.
40. "Loss of a chance" would be a better analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 123-125.
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to which one or more of the "conditions" are "selected" by various means
to be "causes." 4
Hart and Honor6 have a "popular" theory of their own. Ordinary us-
age, they claim, distinguishes between "causes" and mere "conditions."
Both are "conditions" in the Millian sense, as modified by their criticisms.
Mere conditions, however, are simply "part of the background," whereas
causes stand out. Conditions are part of the "normal" course of events or
state of affairs, whereas causes are abnormal, unusual events or states that
make the difference between a particular unexpected result and things go-
ing on as usual.42 Thus, if I am electrocuted by a defective television set,
although my buying the set is a condition of my injury, it is not, according
to Hart and Honor6, its cause. Rather, the cause is the unusual event,
namely the defect. But if I am allergic to strawberries and fall ill when I
eat them, the cause of my illness is the allergy, not the normal background
events of growing and selling strawberries.
The authors admit that what counts as a cause or a condition is neither
fixed nor absolute. The dividing line changes according to both context
and practicality.48 As regards context, one would not, for example, in nor-
mal circumstances regard the presence of oxygen as the "cause" of a par-
ticular fire, even though it is always a necessary part of any set of events
sufficient for a fire; one would say that oxygen was merely part of the
background. If, on the other hand, a fire broke out in what was, perhaps
for experimental reasons, supposed to be a vacuum, the presence of oxy-
gen might well be said to have been the (or a) cause of the fire. A doctor,
to take a more practical example, might properly say that the cause of a
patient's illness was disease A (as opposed to disease B), and that the way
in which the patient contracted the disease (for example, catching it from
person X rather than person Y) was merely part of the background. The
patient, on the other hand, could equally properly cite the circumstances
in which the disease was caught as the (or a) cause of the illness.
B. Solving Puzzles
With this conceptual apparatus the authors investigate and analyze a
number of notorious puzzles. Sometimes they draw mainly from their
modified version of Mill; at other times they elaborate on their own popu-
lar theory. Examples of the former include their discussions of additional
cause problems and license cases. The three-house-fire problem, for exam-
41. See CAUSATION at 31.
42. Id. at 28-41.
43. Context, according to the authors, describes the "normal" state of affairs of a given situation.
Practicality refers to the practical interest of the parties who are perceiving causes and their effects.
Id. at 35-37 (examples).
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ple, in which two fires, one in each of two houses, combine to burn down
a third house, is an additional cause problem, as is the firing squad prob-
lem, where two people simultaneously shoot a third. The question is on
what grounds can both the fire-starters or all the shooters be said to have
caused the result when it would have made no difference if any one of
them had not acted. A license case is one where X engages in an activity
without a permit required by law-piloting a ship, for instance. Without
otherwise being at fault, X's activity results in damage to Y. Should X be
held liable even though absence of the license made no difference?
Both additional cause and license cases are considered in a chapter that
criticizes the traditional "sine qua non" or "but-for" formulation, and
demonstrates the superiority of the authors' view, based on Mill's "plural-
ity of causes" doctrine. Mill's doctrine holds that the minimum require-
ment for causal relevance of a condition is that the condition be necessary
to make some imaginable set of conditions sufficient for the result in the
circumstances, even though the set itself may not be necessary for the re-
sult on the particular occasion."' Thus, the presence of other sufficient
causes is irrelevant to whether or not a particular event is a cause.
Among the elaborations of Hart and Honor6's own popular theory are
discussions of what are traditionally called "remoteness" issues-novus
actus interveniens, for example-where the question is whether an extra-
neous event, which happened after the defendant's conduct, but before the
plaintiff suffered harm, "breaks the chain of causation" and thus exoner-
ates the defendant. Their claim is that when two possible "causes" meet
the "makes a difference" test, ordinary usage requires that, when one act
followed the other in time, the first in time be called the cause and the
second be treated as part of the normal course of events unless the second
was either a voluntary act or purely coincidental45-as they define these
terms.4 Thus, when the intervening event is part of the "normal course of
events" (given the defendant's conduct), it will not "break the chain."
Perhaps incongruously, the terms "voluntary" and "coincidental" are
defined technically, without much attention to ordinary usage. "Volun-
tary" bears its Aristotelian sense: an act free from physical compulsion,
ignorance, and error, free from the pressure of moral and legal obligation,
and free from having to choose between two evils.47 The second event only
44. Id. at 109-29; cf Wright, supra note 2, at 1788-1803 (describing necessary element of suffi-
cient set test).
45. CAUSATION at 68-81.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 47-51.
47. CAUSATION at 41 & n.12; see also id. at 136-62. In response to criticism, see, e.g., Mansfield,
supra note 2, at 510-17, Hart and Honor6 have changed the definition of voluntariness in the second
edition. They no longer require that the act must be intended to produce the consequence that is in
fact produced, but only that the actor intended "to exploit the situation created by the defendant, i.e.
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counts as a "coincidence" if its occurrence in conjunction with the first
event is "very unlikely by ordinary standards,"'" if it occurs "without
human contrivance,' 9 and if it is causally unconnected with the first
event. Thus, if X pushes Y to the ground and at that moment a tree falls
on Y with fatal results, one might say that the death came about because
of a coincidence; but if X pushes Y into the tree and a branch that is
shaken free falls onto Y, this, being causally connected, would not count
as a coincidence. Furthermore, the "eggshell skull" rule50 is explained by
a somewhat ad hoc principle to the effect that states of affairs persisting
throughout the period when the event happens, no matter how unusual,
cannot count as coincidental.
51
Both modified Mill and ordinary usage come into play in the direct
assault on the assorted "risk""2 and "foreseeability" 53 theorists.54 Modi-
fied Mill helps refute the argument that even "cause-in-fact" is bound up
with issues of policy, since the sine qua non test cannot deal justly with
obvious problems such as the three-house-fire case. In fact, the three-
house-fire problem does not defeat any theory that accepts the doctrine of
the "plurality of causes."
. The ordinary usage strand is used to show that the risk theories draw
the dividing line between causal and non-causal issues in the wrong place:
they characterize as non-causal, and thus as matters of policy, issues
to treat it as providing the opportunity or occasion for a certain course of conduct." CAUSATION at
136 n.23. Wright, supra note 2, at 1746 n.31, claims that this new definition can only be part of Hart
and Honor6's analysis of intervening events ("the proximate-cause inquiry" as he calls it), but not of
their analysis of what can count as a "cause" as opposed to a "condition" (the "tortious-conduct
inquiry"). He says that this is because the latter "evaluates the conduct of the defendant herself."
This might be true if one takes the new requirement absolutely literally ("the situation created by the
defendant") but surely this is not necessary; "intended-to exploit the situation as it existed" would
suffice. Wright goes on to criticize the new requirement wherever it appears, for "unless it is inter-
preted to require that the intervenor be aware of the 'untoward' risks involved in the situation...
and that the intervenor deliberately (tortiously) act to exploit those risks . . . any voluntary action
affecting the situation ...would be a superseding cause." Id. But from the examples Hart and
Honor6 give, CAUSATION at 137 (defendant wrongfully renews drug prescription and decedent delib-
erately acts to commit suicide; plaintiff returns to England from Australia to be with family during
convalescence and defendant not chargeable with cost because trip was plaintiff's "own choice, not
...medically necessary"), it is clear that the intervening act need not be tortious, and need not have
to do with "risks" in the ordinary sense. In fact, Hart and Honor6 come very close to saying that
voluntary acts (in their own narrow sense) do indeed constitute superseding causes.
48. CAUSATION at 78.
49. Id.
50. The "eggshell skull" rule holds that if the defendant has been negligent, it is no excuse that
plaintiff suffers in an unexpected way because of some unusual pre-existing condition (for example,
an eggshell skull). The defendant has to pay damages to compensate the plaintiff in full, not just for
the harm that would have been suffered by an average person. In short, defendants take plaintiffs as
they find them.
51. CAUSATION at 79-80.
52. See supra note 10.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
54. CAUSATION at xxxiv, li-liii, 6-7, 254-90, 465-97.
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which, according to Hart and Honor6, are really causal. For example, the
"ordinary usage" of "cause" can sensibly distinguish between the two
cases of X pushing Y.55 Therefore, say Hart and HonorS, there is no need
to talk about "policy" matters, such as the distribution of risk. Further-
more, since voluntary acts "break the chain of causation," as a matter of
common sense one need not plunge into the morass of "reasonable foresee-
ability" to solve cases of third-party intervention.
At least a third of the book is devoted to the authors' analyses of case
law in not only Great Britain and the United States, but also Australia
and South Africa, Germany and France. Most of the revisions for the
second edition stem from the new cases of the last twenty-six years.56 But
despite the intervening case law, the authors' attitude towards judges is
markedly different from their attitude towards academics. In the tradition
of English academic timidity, which usually masquerades as humility,
Hart and Honor6 use their theory not to criticize judicial pronouncements
but only to "explain" them.6 7 That is, for the most part they arrange their
thoughts so that they will agree with the judge (and indeed, when left
with little to complain about in a rival academic theory, they do not hesi-
tate to castigate it for not being in line with authority).5" When they are
unable to agree with a judge's remarks, they take great pains to justify the
result of the case in their own terms.
There is, however, a benefit which sometimes accrues to those who will
55. See supra text following note 49.
56. See supra note 3. The most important discussions are those of The Wagon Mound (No. 1)
(CAUSATION at 174, 255-56, 269, 274-75, 283, 320), Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (id. at 424),
McGhee v. National Coal Bd. (id. at 102, 410), Baker v. Willoughby and Jobling v. Associated
Dairies (id. at 247-48). Regarding Wagon Mound, which Glanville Williams hailed as the adoption
of the risk theory by the highest court of the British Commonwealth, see Williams, supra note 2, at
70-71, Hart and HonorE joyfully join those who say that its only effect is to make foresecability of the
type of harm relevant to defendant's responsibility as well as his negligence, and that it has left the
causation-based eggshell-skull rule untouched. CAUSATION at 225, 275. Sindell and McGhee they see
as dispensing with the causation requirement altogether. Id. at 410, 424. For other possible interpre-
tations of McGhee and the test of materially increasing a risk, see infra text accompanying notes
120-129. Concerning Baker they fail to make clear that the plaintiff did not recover from the defend-
ant for the additional damage caused by the second tortfeasor, but on the whole they agree with other
writers, see, e.g., Fraser & Howarth, More Concern for Cause, 4 LEGAL STUD. 131, 137 (1984), that
the case was really more about compensation than causation. CAUSATION at 247. They justifyJobling
on the ground that "policy" does not require that the defendant guarantee the plaintiff against subse-
quent illness where the intervention is not tortious. Id. at 248. They do not specify what exactly this
policy is.
57. Examples of this deference are innumerable. Indeed, the authors state that they are seeking
"to understand rather than to manipulate the principles of legal responsibility." Id. at 132. Is this
consistent with a sentence that starts, "But in outline if the views advocated in this book are accepted
."? Id. at 428. See Brett, supra note 2, at 95-96 (noting lack of criticism of cases).
58. For example, Keeton's views are dismissed with the remark, "[i]t suffices to note here that at
least one American case decides that a defendant may be liable for harm caused by his violation of a
regulation even though the harm was not 'within the risk' which made it wrongful to commit the
violation." CAUSATION at 289; see also id. at 304 ("[tlhese results may be found satisfactory by some
but they are without support in existing law").
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never say that a judge is wrong, and that is a new, useful distinction. Hart
and Honors have had to explain why, since their first edition, there has
been a tendency in virtually all jurisdictions to find liability despite a vol-
untary or coincidental intervening act (most notably in their category of
negligently providing another with opportunities to harm the plaintiff,
such as allowing a drunken driver to borrow one's car). 9 Their explana-
tion is that the courts are developing a new sort of liability in which cau-
sation is replaced by the lesser requirement that the defendant's conduct
be causally relevant in their modified Millian sense. Following Hume,
though perhaps not contemporary usage, they call this "occasioning
harm."60 To an outside observer, this new ground of liability without cau-
sation sounds very similar to some versions of the risk theory.61 But Hart
and Honor6's story is that, while the risk theory is gaining acceptance in a
limited number of situations, it still does not express in any way the
"meaning" of causation throughout the law. 2
III. ORDINARY LANGUAGE AND COMMON SENSE
The most obvious, but also the most fundamental, way of attacking
Hart and Honor6 is to question their method. Why should we care
whether the speech of lawyers accords with the speech of other people? So
what if the law cannot be squared with common sense? Did not Coke
inform James I that law was not natural but artificial reason? 63 Was it
not once common sense that the Earth was flat? More seriously, if ordi-
nary usage is to be the measure of right and wrong, does it not follow that
all innovation in thought, and thus in language and every aspect of life, is
to be condemned-at least until it becomes the new orthodoxy?
64
A critique of method is a more thoroughgoing criticism than merely
announcing, as some critics have, that they do not share Hart and Ho-
nor6's intuitions about the usage of a particular term, or the correct way
to characterize a situation, or the right answer to a hypothetical.6" Such
disagreement could be seen as merely part of the process of an academic
59. See generally id. at 59-61, 80-82, 194-250.
60. Id. at xiv-xlviii, 26, 194-204.
61. For example, I own a store selling guns. I fail properly to secure the door, with the result that
someone breaks in, steals a gun and uses it to shoot you. You sue me for negligence. Is it not the case
that the strongest argument for liability is that the risk of someone breaking in, stealing a gun and
using it to cause harm is precisely the risk which I am supposed to guard against by securing the
door? See supra note 10.
62. CAUSATION at 204.
63. Case of Prohibitions, 12 Coke 63 (1607). Sadly, lawyers' language protects lawyers not only
from the state, but also from the lay populace. The two are inseparable in democratic society.
64. See generally Edgeworth, Legal Positivism and the Philosophy of Language: A Critique of
H.L.A. Hart's 'Descriptive Sociology', 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1986).
65. See, e.g., J. MACKIE, supra note 2; De Wet, supra note 2; Mansfield, supra note 2.
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community's philosophizing about ordinary language. After all, the em-
pirical base for assertions about what the "plain man" or "ordinary wo-
man" would find an unnatural use of language is usually very narrow-a
few friends, fellow diners at High Table, perhaps the occasional student.
Often the only way to find out whether or not an idea is common sense is
to assert it as a fact and wait for reactions. Admittedly, Hart and Honor6
are more vulnerable than most on such points, not only because they
sometimes adopt plainly technical and non-standard definitions, 6 but also
because they claim to be reporting on ordinary usages in languages of
which they are not native speakers, such as German and American. It is
difficult to see how they can identify the common sense of societies to
which they do not belong.
Another related, although not identical, criticism is that if one really
listened to ordinary speech, both in and out of the law, one would hear
causal theories very different from the ones expounded by Hart and Ho-
nor6. Common expressions describe causes as "having potency" or
"power," or "operating" or "coming to rest." Hart and Honor6 dismiss
such expressions as "obscure metaphors. ' 67 John Mansfield, by contrast,
points out how they fit neatly into German "individualizing" theories,68 of
which the two main characteristics are a denial of any need to relate the
causality of particular events to generalizations and an assertion of the
possibility of comparing the causal import of different events." These the-
ories have as strong a claim to be "common sense" as the theories of
Hume, Mill, and Mackie. British empiricism may well be common sense
in Oxford, but Aristotle's physics may be second nature in Heidelberg.
The only reply to this last point in Causation in the Law is that judi-
cial users of "individualizing" theories sometimes find that such theories
"break down" and that the results eventually achieved are consistent with
the Hart and Honor6 theory. 0 But they also admit that there are points
at which their own theory "breaks down" and that the results are consis-
tent with risk and probabilistic theories.7 1 In neither case does it follow
66. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 47 (discussing definition of "voluntary").
67. CAUSATION at 442; see also id. at 14-15, 30, 73-74.
68. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 497.
69. CAUSATON at 431-64.
70. Id. at 464 ("common-sense causal limitations are introduced in a disguised form as part of the
theory of fault").
71. Two examples are the exclusion of harm caused by a "process of a radically different sort
from any that could be expected," id. at Ixvii, and the extension of liability to include harm "within
the risk" where there is only an "occasioning" relationship. Both of these rules do not follow easily
from Hart and Honor 's approach. Why, for example, should the exact process by which a result
comes about be foreseeable in order to count as a cause? These are, however, risk theory results in
line with, for example, Wagon Mound (No. 1), Overseas Tankship v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., 1961
A.C. 388; see CAUSATION at lxvii, 176, 275-84, 287.
1403
The Yale Law Journal
that the theory adopted after the "break down" is in use at any other
time.
An empirical investigation of ideas of causation could begin with the
construction of a number of different workable causal theories. Then, one
would ask questions about when and why the same person appeared to
use different theories and different people appeared to use the same the-
ory. But Hart and HonorE do not attempt such an empirical investigation
despite the occasional protestation that their business is not to manipulate
but to understand causal notions, 2 Causation in the Law's authors are
advocates, not sociologists."
This takes us back to the original question: Even if Hart and Honor6
were accurately to describe ordinary usage, why should we worry if our
usage is non-standard?
Hart and Honor6's reply, judged by their own very high standards, is
extremely weak .7 Their only response appears to be that one should ac-
cept "ordinary usage" because judges from time to time claim to do so.75
Even if their only intention were to understand judicial behavior, which it
is not, why are they so ready here to take what judges say at face value,
particularly when elsewhere in the book they are not?
This criticism does not establish that there are no reasons to adopt ordi-
nary usage as a standard. It merely shows that Hart and Honor6 provide
none. One can only speculate that, as good positivists, they were worried
that they may have committed themselves to an argument that threatened
to shift from what is to what ought to be, a linguistic version of Stamm-
ler's natural law with variable content.7 Such totems need not detain any-
one else.
One possible argument for ordinary usage is the weakness of the alter-
natives. The only other theory on offer is that causal language, indeed all
legal language, is "functional. 7 7 That is, words and concepts exist only to
be manipulated for some end. But what end? Suggestions include the
maximization of wealth, 8 the minimization of the costs of accidents and of
72. See supra note 57.
73. Compare Edgeworth, supra note 64. Advocacy by re-description is the most familiar of com-
mon law methods. It is more interesting when scholars adopt the same method. Recent examples
include G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982), and R. DWORKIN,
LAW's EMPIRE (1986). These days "law as . . ." is more important than "law and . . .".
74. They do provide a reply to a different, interesting, question: Even assuming that one accepted
their theory, why should one use it to establish legal liability? I consider that question below.
75. CAUSATION at xxxiv.
76. See C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 24 (7th ed. 1964); see generally R. STAMMLER, THE
THEORY OF JUSTICE (I. Husik trans. 1925).
77. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 471-73; De Wet, supra note 2, at 141-42. Green, supra note
2, at 566 n.71. But see Calabresi, supra note 13, at 70 ("This functional approach has come to
dominate American tort scholarship.").
78. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
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their avoidance,7 ' corrective justice,80 distributive justice (including the
spreading of risk),"' and justice simpliciter,8 ' not to mention the further-
ance of whatever other ad hoc policies lie behind particular enactments
and constitutions. Hart and Honor6 suggest that one cannot even resort to
compensation of the victims of misfortune because compensation paid by a
wrongdoer (the "ordinary" meaning of compensation, according to Hart
and Honor6-but is it?) differs significantly from compensation paid by
someone else.83
Most likely, these various goals are incompatible. Even if we could
agree on a coherent ranking of them, we would probably disagree on how
to further them in any particular case. Hart and Honor6 could well argue
that the functional approach is liable to lead to chaos. One is much more
likely to find agreement about central or core meanings of words than
about policies or political programs.
There are two major objections to this claim that the functional ap-
,proach should be rejected as demonstrably inferior. The first objection is
that we cannot assume that we are in a position to choose between treat-
ing language as autonomous and treating it as "functional." Once one has
thought of the latter possibility, it is very difficult to return to the former.
One starts to see interests everywhere, even where there is only blissful
ignorance. It is like being expelled from Paradise-and for similar reasons
as in the original.
Many people are trying to recreate Paradise by raising an edifice of
goals and purposes that they hope will achieve general assent.8 In conse-
quence, these people never tire of exposing subterfuges and fudged argu-
ments and demanding that questions of policy and morality be clearly de-
fined and explicitly discussed." They do this because Paradise cannot
truly be regained unless we agree on everything. Unfortunately, clarity is
79. G. CAI-ABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
80. Epstein, supra note 2; Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice, supra note 8; Epstein,
Nuisance Law, supra note 8.
81. Calabresi, supra note 13, at 102-05.
82. ETHICS, supra note 19, at 179 n.2; G. CALABRESI, supra note 79, at 26-31; see also R.
DWORKIN, supra note 73, at 242-44 (justice within bounds of "integrity").
83. CAUSATION at lxxiii.
84. Even Calabresi gives this impression, see Calabresi, supra note 13, at 70; G. CALABRESI,
supra note 79. For his considered opinions, see generally G. CA..ABRESI & P. BoBBrrr, TRAGIC
CHOICES (1978), and now G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTIrUDES AND THE LAW (1985). His
view is that "our" shared scheme of values is incoherent and contradictory. It is, however, the best
"we" can do. Calabresi is a conflict theorist only in the sense that he is concerned with internal
conflicts which everyone in a society could suffer. He does not analyze these internal conflicts as
conflicts of interest between specific groups, or emphasize the overall importance of such conflicts. In
other words, his view is that a return to Paradise requires both consensus and- honesty, but that it is
impossible to achieve both simultaneously.
85. See, e.g., R. KEETON, supra note 2, at 93-94; Cole, supra note 2, at 465; Green, supra note
2, at 562-76; Mansfield, supra note 2, at 488-89, 522 (criticizing Hart and HonorE for lack of
clarity).
1405
The Yale Law Journal
not always prudent; 6 it may serve only to sharpen conflicts, or even to
make them unresolvable.
The other objection is that to agree to be governed by the dictates of
whatever happens to be general usage is like agreeing to be governed by
the toss of a coin. The analogy is not quite exact because, unlike pure
chance, there would be at least a degree of formal rationality in decisions
according to ordinary usage-that is, reasons of a sort would be given.
Nevertheless, the analogy is useful insofar as such a system would not
operate on the basis of substantive rationality. 7 Hart and Honor6 might
reply that "ordinary language" does not develop randomly, but reflects
and expresses an underlying consensus about ethical and political stan-
dards;" indeed it expresses this consensus more accurately than, for ex-
ample, professional political philosophy.89
Hart and Honors's position is capable of a more subtle exposition.
They are separating their instructions on the application of their method
from the justification for using their method at all. They enjoin judges to
treat "ordinary language" as an objective fact about other people, one fun-
damentally beyond the judges' own personal preferences and beyond their
ability to manipulate. In so doing, judges will, in fact, be following the
ethical and political principles of ordinary people, although they will not
understand themselves to be applying any such principles. Instead, they
will see themselves as making factual judgments based on common sense.
Thus Hart and Honor6 manage to combine democracy with purely "le-
gal" (non-political) judicial interpretation.
Nevertheless, this reply is open to important objections. To begin with,
if there is no evidence of consensus on "ordinary" usage, then evidence of
a shared way of life and shared values must be found elsewhere. But even
if we were to find probative evidence as to lawyers' opinions on issues
other than usage, it is far from clear that this evidence would support
Hart and Honor6. It is more likely that, although lawyers share some
values and ways of life, there is more conflict and difference than consen-
sus among them.90
86. But see Calabresi, supra note 13, at 107-08.
87. See 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 656-57 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968)
(Weberian sense of substantive rationality).
88. For example, constitutions are supposed to express a long-term, developing consensus. See,
e.g., G. CAI.ABRESI, supra note 73, at 51; Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitu-
tion, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1039-72 (1984). But see R. DWORKIN, supra note 73, at 355-99.
89. Oddly, this very point was used to criticize Hart and Honor 's claim that ordinary language
can sort out causation problems without recourse to policy. See Hancock, supra note 2, at 151-52
(usage of term is not necessarily policy-free, since usage may have come to reflect long-term value
consensus).
90. See generally R. COLLINS, CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY: TOWARD AN EXPLANATORY SCIENCE
(1975); R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1959); E. RUB-
INGTON & M. WEINBERG, THE STUDY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS: FIVE PERSPECTIVES 87-127 (3d ed.
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In any case, the reply presupposes that consensus is necessarily a good
thing. It may not be. First, it may reflect not shared values, but the distri-
bution of power. In a society where inequality of power is so great that
those at the bottom have no hope of improving their situation, and per-
haps may not even be able to formulate independent views, one might find
a "consensus" that is no more than a surly, demoralized acceptance of the
status quo. Second, a large degree of consensus may be a bad idea.91 A
moderate degree of conflict encourages innovation-excessive consensus
may stifle it. 2 More generally, excessive consensus promotes a totalitarian
frame of mind-those who rarely encounter difference may not be able to
tolerate it. Freedom entails the possibility of difference, and difference
carries the risk of conflict.
IV. THE CONTEXT OF CAUSATION
A major deficiency in the first edition of Causation in the Law was the
lack of an overall view of the relationship between causation and other
elements of liability. According to several critics, 93 this resulted in an over-
emphasis on causation and a tendency to lose sight of the complexity of
the issues that Hart and Honor6 lumped together as "legal policy." This
deficiency is made good in the Preface to the second edition in the shape
of a short essay entitled "Legal Responsibilty and Legal Policy."94
The essay is divided into four parts. The first is an elementary model of
the grounds for responsibility in law; the second, based on an article by
Honor, 95 distinguishes two causal limitations on legal responsibilty from
three non-causal ones; the third discusses one way in which, they claim,
causal issues come to be confused with non-causal issues; and finally,
Hart and Honor6 refer to the incidence of the burden of proof. I shall
consider each in turn.
1981).
91. See, e.g., N. MACHIAVELLI, DIscouRsEs ON THE FIRST TEN BOOKS OF TITUS LIvy 111-15
(B. Crick ed. 1970) (Books 1.4, 1.6).
92. See, e.g., K. MARX, The British Rule in India, in 2 MARX: SURVEYS FROM EXILE 305-07
(D. Fernbach ed. 1973); Coser, Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change, 8 BRIT. J. Soc. 197
(1957). See generally L. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956) (social conflict can
contribute to group cohesion).
This is, of course, far from all there is to say about innovation, technical or social. See generally J.
ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE (1983). Indeed, Marx can be read as believing that
under socialism, when there will be no social conflict, technical innovation will occur at an unheard of
rate. This does not, however, seem plausible.
93. See CAUSATION at xlii-xliii (discussing critics).
94. Id. at xlii-xlv.
95. Honor6, Causation and Remoteness of Damage, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW: TORTS (1983).
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A. Grounds of Liability
The Hart and Honor6 grounds of liability model reduces all problems
of legal liability to three questions. The first question is what kind of
causation is required for liability. Hart and HonorE allow three possible
answers: (1) Full causation, which is "cause" in the sense advocated by
Causation in the Law. "Cause" in this sense is not just a background
condition, but a cause unencumbered by voluntary or coincidental inter-
vening causes; (2) "Occasioning," meaning being a "but-for" cause-that
is, a "condition;" 96 (3) No causation requirement at all. The second ques-
tion is whether fault is necessary for liability-in the broadest sense of
fault, one which includes both intentional and negligent wrongdoing. The
third question is whether any "conduct" at all on the part of the defend-
ant is necessary. Hart and Honor6 combine these questions to produce
seven species of liability, which might be represented as follows:
Fig. 1. Hart and Honor's Grounds of Liability Model.
WHAT KIND OF CAUSATION
IS NECESSARY?
FULL CAUSATION OCCASIONING NONE
I I I
IS FAULT IS FAULT IS FAULT
NECESSARY? NECESSARY? NECESSARY?
YES NO YES NO YES NO
5I IS CONDUCTNECESSARY?
YES NO1 1
96. This sort of cause could perhaps more accurately be characterized as being a necessary mem-
ber of a sufficient set.
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Species 1 is the position of classical negligence and many other torts
and crimes. A finding of liability requires both full causation, not just
"occasioning," and fault of some sort. Species 2 is where there is strict
liability but full causation; Rylands v. Fletcher9 7 is an example. Species 3
is where fault is necessary for liability but full causation is not, "occasion-
ing" being sufficient. This would describe liability for negligently provid-
ing another with an opportunity to harm the plaintiff, for example, where
P is injured by a car negligently driven by T, after T had stolen it from
D, who had negligently left the doors open and keys inside. D's fault did
not "cause" P's injury in the full sense, because T's act is voluntary and
intervening. But it did "occasion" the injury. Species 4 is where only "oc-
casioning" is required but not fault. This would describe the liability of a
seller of goods for non-delivery, who has no excuse even if the non-
delivery is caused by the act of an independent third party. Species 5 is
where a defendant is condemned for being at fault without any proof of
causation. Examples would be crimes of dishonesty, possessing stolen
goods, or attempting a crime.
If neither a finding of fault nor a finding of causation is required for
liability, Hart and Honor6 go on to ask the third question: Is any conduct
on the part of the defendant necessary for liability?9" What exactly they
mean by "conduct" is unclear, but it appears that the lack of a conduct
requirement (Species 7) moves into the realm of the liability of insurers
and guarantors (whose liability presumably arises from their obligations,
not their own movements). Where a finding of "conduct" is necessary,
although in the absence of fault and causation, the matter is characteristi-
cally one of strict liability crimes or regulatory offenses. Certain automo-
bile offenses in Britain, for example driving without rear lights, would be
in this category. While it is no defense that one did not know of the prob-
lem, nor that it caused no harm, it is necessary that one have been driving.
If the only point of Hart and Honor6's model was to show that "legis-
lators and, in default of clear guidance from them, . . . judges"99 have a
wide range of theories of liability to choose from, not all of them contain-
ing the requirement of causation, then it would have achieved its purpose.
The choice of which ground is relevant in a particular type of case is
indeed always a matter of "policy." But if the point is also to locate causa-
tion in legal liability as a whole, then the model has to be accurate, and it
is not.
97. 11866] 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Exchequer Chamber); [1868] 3 L.R.-H.L. 339 (House of Lords).
98. The question is irrelevant if either a finding of fault or some kind of causation is required. To
be at fault, or to cause or occasion something, seems to entail conduct of some sort, even if only of
omission.
99. CAUSATION at xlvii.
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To begin with, the "conduct" question100 leaves much to be desired. It
is relevant only with respect to one combination of tests-the liability of
insurers and guarantors-and even then it does not work. Presumably, the
relevant conduct is agreeing to insure or guarantee. Much worse, the
"causation" element is conflated with an element that does not figure ex-
plicitly in the model but should, namely "harm." Surely one has to ask
whether anything needs to be "caused" before asking either how it has to
be "caused" or what should count as "causing." Hart and Honor 's model
is confusing because two of their answers to the question "what kind of
cause?" (namely, full causation and occasioning) presuppose that some-
thing is caused, whereas the third answer (no causation requirement) pre-
supposes no such thing. This explains why they introduce their "conduct"
question, unsatisfactory though it is. The result is that their model has no
place for liability where it is necessary to find that the plaintiff was
harmed, but not necessary to find that the defendant caused or occasioned
the harm. Sindell v. Abbott LaboratoriesT10 would fall into this category.
There, liability was imposed on wrongdoing defendants, even though it
was impossible to show that a particular defendant caused or even occa-
sioned the harm to a particular plaintiff. Admittedly, it might sometimes
be possible to deal with such cases by saying that the plaintiff is suing not
for the harm itself but for the increased risk of harm occasioned or caused
by the defendant. 102 But this approach will be unsatisfactory where a de-
fendant is held responsible for the whole damage, not just for the propor-
tion of the damage equivalent to the increased risk. One such case is Sum-
mers v. Tice,103 where both D1 and D2 were held liable for the whole loss
suffered by P when they had both fired shotguns in P's general direction,
but only one pellet-unidentifiable beyond the fact that it came from ei-
ther Dl's or D2's gun-had injured him.
If one reconstructs the model, accepting Hart and Honor6's conceptual
analysis, but also taking into account the above criticism of its structure,
one obtains a more accurate framework. In the new model there are still
three questions, but the "conduct" question is replaced by a "harm" ques-
tion: Is it necessary for some victim or plaintiff to have suffered harm
before liability is found? The new model has four new species of liability,
in addition to Species 1-4 of Hart and Honor 's model.104
100. See supra text accompanying note 98.
101. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
102. See infra text accompanying note 125.
103. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
104. Hart and Honor's Species 2 through 4 are substantially similar to Species 2 through 4 in
the modified model.
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The four new species in the modified model are numbers 5A, 6A, 7A,
and 8A. Species 5A accounts for the Sindell and Summers examples al-
ready discussed. Species 6A is a no-fault version of Species 5A, and is the
proper home of the liability of insurers and guarantors. In these cases
there is no liability without damage to someone (the insured or the credi-
tor), but the defendant need not have been at fault nor in any way have
caused the damage. In Species 7A and 8A, it is unnecessary to discuss
causation at all, since the question of causation is irrelevant where there is
no need to show damage. Species 7A, where liability is founded on fault
alone, without the necessity of showing harm, most obviously covers "vic-
timless crimes" (illegal consensual sexual acts, for example) but also, per-
haps more importantly, criminal attempts and conspiracies. Number 8A,
where neither harm nor fault need be shown, is broad. It includes infa-
mous "status crimes" (being a relative of an enemy of the state, for exam-
ple), as well as some minor regulatory offenses where liability is strict
(e.g., selling adulterated food even where the goods cannot be inspected by
the seller). It would also include the anomalous tort of trespass to land
and, by extension, actions to vindicate property rights.
Working through the consequences and details of the modified model is
beyond the scope of a book review. It may be, for example, that Hart and
Honor$'s category of "neither full causation nor occasioning" ("none" in
the diagrams) needs to be broken down further. Species 6A of the modi-
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fied model (no fault and no causation) includes both insurance liability
and a Sindell situation in a jurisdiction with strict liability for products.
But these are clearly different sorts of liability. In the insurance case there
need not even be the possibility that the defendant caused the harm. In the
products case, however, it has to be possible, even though it cannot be
shown, that the defendant's activity caused the harm. If a Sindell defend-
ant could show that its actions could not possibly have caused the harm,
the defendant would win-but such a defense would be ludicrous in an
insurance case.105
Nevertheless, the modified model as it stands does serve to illustrate
that even in their second edition Hart and Honors have not fully worked
out the connections between causation issues and other issues. Most im-
portantly, as the diagrams illustrate, Hart and HonorE make causation the
first and thus central question in their model of the grounds of liability.
This produces confusion. Even if causation is one of the important ques-
tions, it is not relevant all of the time, whereas other questions, such as
fault, are.
B. Limits of Legal Responsibility
A similar problem arises in the second section of the mini-essay, "The
limits of legal responsibility."106 Hart and Honors identify five types of
limitations that may be imposed on legal rules: necessity, later interven-
tion, probability, the scope of the rule, and equity. The first two they
characterize as "causal," questions of fact suitable for decision by a jury.
The last three they characterize as "non-causal," presumably questions of
law and policy best suited for decision by the judge. Furthermore, the
question of whether each limitation is applicable at all to the case at hand
is also a question of law for the judge.
"Necessity" is simply their modified Millian version of causa sine qua
non, that is, the requirement that the defendant at least "occasioned" the
harm. "Later intervention" means intervening voluntary actions and "co-
incidences" which, they allege, would rob the antecedent condition of title
to the epithet "cause." "Probability" includes foreseeability (about which
the authors are "less enthusiastic"1 7 as a limitation, though they would
admit it as an extension of liability). It also includes such questions as
whether the apparent risk of harm was sufficiently great given the defend-
105. Cf CAUSATION at liii-liv. The same point applies to Species 5A in the modified model.
What "possible" means here remains to be resolved. An approach combining the question "do you
think that it was at all likely that X caused Y" might be possible, combining a subjective probability
with the principle de minimis non curat lex.
106. CAUSATION at xlvii-li.
107. Id. at li.
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ant's conduct, or was significantly increased by it, and whether, as per the
German formula, the conduct was "adequate" for the harm."'8 "Equity"
appears to be the application of such overarching principles as the "moral
injustice" of allowing people to benefit from their own wrongdoing.109 A
"scope" limitation is based on the argument that a rule should not apply
outside the area of activity it is designed to regulate. Scope limitations are
most appropriate to breaches of statutory duty (a separate theory of liabil-
ity in England, not just part of negligence), as for example in the famous
case of Gorris v. Scott.'10
Most of the controversy between Hart and Honor6 and their various
critics can be derived from this schema. In particular, labelling "later in-
tervention" issues as causal and factual and "probability" issues as non-
causal neatly sums up the conclusions of Causation in the Law that most
frequently elicit dissent.
If, as Hart and Honor6 say, "later intervention" issues can be charac-
terized as causal and factual, then one can draw conclusions about the
significance of intervening actions of third parties without reference to is-
sues apart from causation, and without recourse to ethical or policy argu-
ments. However, they also say that an intervening event cannot limit lia-
108. See CAUSATION 465-97 ("adequate cause," or more recently just "adequacy," is a form of
substantially-increasing-the-risk theory).
109. Id. at 1, 217 n.58.
110. [18741 9 L.R.-Ex. 125. A statute required pens of not more than a certain dimension to be
installed on ships that carried domestic animals. The defendant failed to provide such pens. The
plaintiff's sheep were washed overboard, for which the defendant was not held liable. The conven-
tional exegesis of this case, followed by Hart and HonorE, is that since the purpose of the statute was
to prevent disease and not drowning, the harm suffered must have fallen outside its scope. Because
Keeton's risk theory requires causation and scope to amount to the same thing, he also argues that the
violation of the statute cannot be the cause, since the defendant could have breached the statute while
preventing the drowning, for example by providing pens that were too big for the law, but big enough
to save the sheep. Keeton, supra note 2, at 16. This argument depends on a strict version of the
"negligent aspect" theory whereby the causal tests are applied not to the defendant's conduct as a
whole, but only to the "negligent" part of it (In the Gorris case, using the wrong sized pens and no
other possibly wrongful aspect of the defendant's behavior). Some writers reject the "negligent aspect"
approach in toto. See, e.g., Green, supra note 2, at 562-74. Hart and Honor6 claim to have a "mod-
erate" position that "courts generally require the wrongful features of the defendant's conduct to be
shown to be causally relevant, but sometimes, for special reasons, impose a more stringent liability by
treating the causality of other, lawful features . . . as sufficient." CAUSATION at lxi. They reject,
therefore, Keeton's more specific theory, but talk about whether "lawful conduct" would have avoided
the harm. They fail to see that this standard is troublesome when applied to common law negligence.
See infra text accompanying notes 141-46. Moreover, they fail to appreciate that, as in the license
cases, there are always two ways of acting lawfully: Carry on as before, but obey the statute (get a
license), or refrain completely from the activity in question. (This is related to the "elimination"
versus "substitution" debate referred to supra note 26.) The question becomes one of statutory policy.
Licenses are required for a variety of reasons: to raise revenue, to impose training, to discourage the
activity without banning it. In Gorris, one possible policy was to keep as many diseased sheep as
possible out of Britain; that is, it was a public health statute. From this point of view, the fact that the
plaintiff's sheep were at the bottom of the Channel was at most neutral, and perhaps a good thing
(especially since they were unpenned). The result of the accident in this regard approximated that
which should have happened had the statute been obeyed-keeping diseased sheep from reaching
Britain.
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bility unless it alone would count as a "cause" under the "makes a
difference to normal functioning" test."i This last point is subject to chal-
lenge: If one cannot establish that an event is a "cause" in the "makes a
difference" sense without importing moral or at least practical criteria, the
claim that we are dealing here with purely "factual" issues cannot be
sustained.112
Attempts to define methods of establishing "makes a difference" causa-
tion in terms of purely factual issues tend to turn on definitions of nor-
mality or voluntariness. "Normality" arguments begin with the observa-
tion, shared by Hart and HonorE, that deciding whether an event is the
"cause" or just "part of the background" varies with the context and one's
interest in the problem." 3 Some writers have gone on from this to say that
the question is purely practical: Which of the conditions might one be able
to influence next time?" 4 Hart and Honor6 reply that frequently we lo-
cate causes where we could have no influence at all (the weather, for
example), and the authors imply that the practical interests involved in
legal judgment are of little consequence because the issues and the interest
of the investigator are rarely controversial. One might reply in turn that
the investigator has a clear interest in assigning blame. But the authors
could answer that the proposition that in some circumstances causation is
a necessary condition of legal responsibility does not give any grounds to
believe that responsibility is a necessary condition of causation. Further,
one might argue that the notion of "normal" or "natural" functioning is
inherently normative. Hart and Honor6 could reply that a sequence of
events can be "normal" even though one disapproves of it"' (the "normal
working method" used by a particular murderer, for example). This defi-
nition may be technically correct, but it is not "ordinary usage." The
phrase "usual course of events" approaches what Hart and Honors in-
tend, but except for contractual problems' they appear to avoid using it.
Perhaps this is because the phrase has the connotation of frequency and




Another way of attacking the classification of intervening events as
"factual" is to look more closely at the criteria that Hart and Honor6 use
111. See supra text accompanying note 42.
112. Of course, this situation would not entail the removal of the issue from the jury-as Hart
and Honor6 seem to think it would.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
114. See, e.g., R. COLLINGWOOD, AN ESSAY ON METAPHYSICS 300 (1940).
115. Hart and Honor6 do not actually argue this way because they are more concerned with the
issue of causing someone harm, not causing them to benefit.
116. CAUSATION at 315-17.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 122-31.
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to decide whether such events are "voluntary." The point is not that the
whole enterprise requires us to make claims about the thoughts and states
of mind of other people. There is no need to restrict our notion of "fac-
tual" to the way in which we might investigate physical phenomena. The
point is that judgments about what is sufficient knowledge for making an
informed choice, and judgments about whether one has "no real choice"
because one must elect one of two "evils," cannot be resolved by factual
information about the defendant or the situation alone. Consider the fol-
lowing cases, where D injures P in a road accident. In the first case P
refuses to have a blood transfusion for religious reasons. With the transfu-
sion she would have survived, but instead she dies. In the second case a
country doctor ignorant of the latest medical techniques treats P, but fails
to save her. In the first case, from P's point of view, her intervening act is
not fully voluntary because it is a choice between two evils. Whether a
court should so treat it, however, involves issues of religious tolerance and
judgments of what behavior counts as reasonable. In the second case, does
the doctor have sufficient knowledge to make his action count as "volun-
tary"? To answer this question, someone has to make a judgment about
what country doctors ought to know. Again, these judgments of practical
morality may be well within the capacity of a jury, but purely "factual"
they are not.
Hart and HonorE openly admit that moral criteria are important when
the issue is whether to impose liability because R provided S with an
opportunity to harm T, or X robbed Y of the opportunity to avoid harm.
Would S have harmed T anyway? Would Y have taken the opportunity?
Notions of what a reasonable person would have done cannot be excluded
here. However, Hart and Honor6 neatly evade this problem by saying
that these cases exemplify a new type of liability for "occasioning
harm.""1" This exploration concedes the point that judgment in these
cases is not purely factual because, as they admit, whether a particular
test applies is a question of legal policy.
Equally controversial is Hart and Honor6's classification of the
"probability" limitation as non-causal (and non-factual, or at least a non-
jury issue). The contention that these judgments are not factual is surely
untenable. Although on the best view probability is for legal purposes a
subjective matter (what odds would I take that X will happen, or even
that X is the case),119 the same is true for all "factual" judg-
118. CAUSATION at xliv, 194-204.
119. For this "Bayesian" or subjective approach, see, e.g., Giles, A Logic of Subjective Belief, in 1
FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY THEORY, STATISTICAL INFERENCE, AND STATISTICAL THEORIES
OF SCIENCE 41-72 (1976); Schefe, On Foundations of Reasoning with Uncertain Facts and Vague
Concepts, in E. MAMDANI & B. GAINES, FUZZY REASONING AND ITS APPLICATIONS 189-216
(1981) (outlining method of reasoning from subjective uncertainty); see also Gaines, Foundations of
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ments-indeed, perhaps all judgments. We are seldom absolutely certain
about anything of importance; we believe with varying degrees of confi-
dence, sometimes adjusting our beliefs-but more frequently our level of
confidence-in light of new evidence. "Foreseeability" involves a little
more speculation (What would I have said the chances were at the time in
question?) but is in principle no different.
There are better grounds for saying that "probability" is non-causal. As
many writers, including Hart and Honor6, 20 have stressed, a belief, or
even certain knowledge, that X is followed by Y Q% of the time differs
from a belief that X causes Y, even if Q is greater than 50%. The differ-
ence is that if one only believes in the probability, a single case in which
X was not followed by Y makes no difference to one's belief (unless one
believes that Q equals 100%). On the other hand, one who believes in the
causal relation would need an explanation: How is this case different
from the norm so that Y has not in this instance occurred? If one could
not find an explanation, one might consider abandoning one's belief. 21
One must, however, be clear about the effects that this argument has on
probabilistic statements used in law. Statements that "under conditions C,
the probability of X is Q" may be causal in the sense that C is thought to
cause a probability field,' 22 such that the likelihood or proportion of X
outcomes is Q (and no other number). Experiment or experience may
show that the proportion of X outcomes is not Q but P. In such circum-
stances one would feel an obligation either to explain away the new pat-
tern or abandon the hypothesis. Furthermore, statements of probability as
expressions of subjective confidence are also not excluded from being
causal. One can still say that one believes with 60% certainty that X
caused Y. If it turned out that in the particular case X did not cause Y,
one might well worry about one's theory, but one's first reaction should be
to apologize for being wrong.
In consequence we should be very careful how we assess the causal
content of phrases like "materially increased the risk of injury," which
sometimes appear in the case law. 2 3 One possible use of such a statement
Fuzzy Reasoning, 8 IN'L J. MAN-MACHINE STUD. 623 (1976).
Judges and jurors do not, of course, literally "bet" money that their opinions are true; they bet
peace of mind and conscience. Even if there is no way that the truth will ever be known, nor that one
will be identified as having made the mistake, a virtuous person will still take this "bet" (or "ven-
ture") seriously. "Rational maximizers" of temporal wealth may not, in fact, act in this way, but that
is their problem.
120. CAUSATION at 48-49.
121. That one does not abandon one's belief in such circumstances is usually a matter of faith that
a convincing explanation does exist, and will turn up, even though one has not yet formulated it.
122. See, e.g., Popper, Quantum Mechanics Without the Observer, in M. BUNGE, QUANTUM
THEORY AND REALITY (1967); cf. R. SHELDRAKE, A NEW SCIENCE OF LIFE 82-85, 96-101, 112,
118 (rev. ed. 1985). See generally K. POPPER & J. ECCLES, THE SELF AND ITS BRAIN (1977).
123. See, e.g., McGhee v. National Coal Bd., 119731 1 W.L.R. 1, 5 (equating materially increas-
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is in a situation where one is reasonably confident that B causes disease
D, and also that C causes disease D. The evidence in the case at hand, D
having occurred, is consistent with both B and C. Experts claim that of all
the instances of D, B is clearly the cause on more occasions than C.
Would one be justified in deciding that in this case B caused D? The
answer is that the validity of this conclusion depends, among other things,
on the absolute difference between the proportion of cases attributable to
the two causes, on the number of instances on which the conclusion is
based, and above all on the degree of uncertainty one is prepared to ac-
cept. In the end, a subjective (or perhaps in most instances a community)
standard of tolerance for doubt will be decisive.
Another possible use of "materially increasing the risk" depends on def-
inite probability fields. Consider the following example: The best evidence
is that if X is present the probability of D is 70%, whereas if X is absent
the probability is only 60%. The defendant causes X to be present and the
plaintiff suffers from D. In these circumstances, we have no causal beliefs
about D itself, but only about the probability of D under different condi-
tions. Thus we cannot say that the defendant caused the harm itself, only
that the defendant caused the harm to be more likely. In this sort of case it
is appropriate to try to value the "lost chances" according to the difference
between the risk levels with and without the defendant's conduct. Note
that it makes no difference whether the risks in question are both below
50%, both above 50%, or one below and one above. We are concerned
with the difference, not the absolute level of risk, for ex hypothesi we have
no beliefs about the causes of harm themselves.
12 4
When Hart and Honor6 resort to the "increased risk"'12 5 idea, they do
not make these distinctions and appear in danger of contradicting them-
selves as a result. The philosopher Mackie challenged Hart and Honor's
analysis of the "speeding" cases, in which breaking the speed limit brings
someone to a point on the road where something bad happens, such as a
tree falling on the car as a result of someone's fault.' 26 The details of the
argument 27 need not detain us here. All that matters is that the second
edition of Causation in the Law adopts the now orthodox view that the
ing risk of injury with materially contributing to injury).
124. The argument in the text might have helped Sir John Donaldson, M.R. in Hotson v. East
Berkshire Health Auth., [1987] 2 W.L.R. 287 (C.A.), leave to appeal to House of Lords granted,
[1987] 1 W.L.R. 224, where he allowed a claim for a loss of a chance (of better medical care) but
proclaimed, id. at 297, "[McGhee is] an authority which I have difficulty in understanding."
125. See CAUSATION at xxxix, 168-78; see also id. at 122, 323-24, 410, 469-70, 473-74, 478,
485-88.
126. See J. MACKIF, supra note 2, at 130-31; see also CAUSATION at xxxviii-xxxix (discussing
Mackie). The classic case, a matter of contributory negligence in a suit against the tree owner, is
Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 191 Pa. 345, 43 A. 240 (1899).
127. CAUSATION at xxxviii-xxxix.
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driver's speeding is not to be counted as a cause of the loss because speed-
ing does not, as far as we know, increase the likelihood that trees will
fall. 128 This statement is unexceptionable if understood as saying that
hearing about this case has not altered our confidence that speeding does
not cause trees to fall; or as saying that speeding does not cause the
probability of trees falling to change, so that the lost chance involved has a
value of zero. By not explaining their usage of "increased risk," however,
Hart and Honors needlessly appear to contradict their own stated position
that, to count as a "coincidence," two events must, among other things, be
causally (not probabilistically) independent 2 9 of one another.
There is also a more radical account of multiple cause problems, not
considered by Hart and HonorS, to the effect that the only possible causal
statements are those about probability fields.1"' If true of physical
events-I am not qualified to judge issues of physics-this assertion will
also be true of social events. Indeed, even this position may be too optimis-
tic a view of generalizations about human affairs. Either because of free
will or because human conduct is so complex,131 human beings must treat
human conduct as radically indeterminate. Hart and Honors (and Mackie
all the more) might reply that this indeterminacy does not matter because
regularities in human conduct are not needed to sustain causal statements
about the conduct.13 2 But because such generalizations must play a large
part in the counterfactual arguments that each of these writers maintains
are necessary for causal statements, 3' I doubt whether one can sustain a
causal argument without them. Even if one could, Hart and Honors
should still be worried by situations of radical indeterminacy. If these ex-
ist, we can never say that a condition, or set of conditions, was or was not
necessary or sufficient for a particular outcome. If events sometimes just
happen without obeying any detectable regularity,' it is impossible to
talk about any event being necessary for any other, or even necessary to
make a set of events sufficient for an outcome.13 5 If events sometimes just
128. That is, barring "vibrations." See Calabresi, supra note 13, at 72.
129. CAUSATION at 78-79, 176-78.
130. For further discussion, see J. MACKIE, supra note 2, at 9. For a more radical view that the
physical "laws" of the universe are not only probabilistic, but also are not constant, being instead built
up historically by repetition of similar events over time, see R. SHELDRAKE, supra note 122. Such
views are not incompatible with a purposive universe. See id. at 199-208; D. BARTHOLOMEW, GOD
OF CHANCE (1984); see also K. WARD, THE TURN OF THE TIDE 33-36 (1986) (discussing God of
Chance).
131. See A. MACINTYRF, AFTER VIRTUE 95-97 (2d ed. 1984). See generally id. ch. 8 (lack of
predictive power of generalizations).
132. CAUSATION at 55; J. MACKIE, supra note 2, at 120-21.
133. But see J. MACKIE, supra note 2, at 57-58, 77-80.
134. This phenomenon we might label as, but not explain by, craziness or actes gratuits.
135. Cf J. MACKIE, supra note 2, at 40-43 (Mackie's "chocolate machine" argument), discussed
in CAUSATION at xl-xli.
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do not happen, despite having occurred invariably under such conditions
in the past, no event, or set of events, can be considered sufficient for any
other-except in the tautological sense that the whole state of the universe
must have been sufficient for the event."3 6
C. The Place of Policy in Causal Issues
The third section of the mini-essay is a counter-blast to those critics
who complained that Hart and Honors failed to appreciate the blending
of causal and policy issues, especially in negligence 137 -for example, on
the issue of "proximate cause." The Hart and Honors reply is essentially
that such blending is the result of unnecessary and damaging confusion on
the part of judges and commentators in the way they have formulated the
issues, and that there is no benefit in reproducing error. But if Hart and
Honors dislike duty, negligence and proximate cause 38 or duty of care,
breach of duty and harm not too remote 39 or duty, harm and risk 40 as
formulae, what do they propose we tell the children? I fear their proposal
is the ponderous model of the first two sections of the mini-essay-the
grounds of liability and the five limitations.
Hart and Honors also fail to take seriously enough the interdependence
of many concepts used in the law of negligence. Consider, for example,
the close relation between "cause-in-fact" and "negligence," or what Eng-
lish lawyers would call "causation" and "breach of duty." This deficiency
in the discussion is all the more surprising since an analysis based on a
full-blooded recognition of the interdependence of key legal concepts can
be employed to support one of Hart and Honor6's central points.
The problem is that if one accepts Learned Hand's famous test as the
best formulation of the negligence-breach-fault issues,14 1 as most Ameri-
can lawyers and Hart and Honore do, one finds it riddled with causal
presuppositions and questions. The most obvious problem is the "likeli-
hood that . . . conduct will injure others" element, for which one must be
able to imagine a great number of causal sequences ending in some kind
136. See J. MACKIE, supra note 2, at 40-43.
137. CAUSATION at lii-liii.
138. See CAUSATION at 1i.
139. See id.
140. See id. at lii.
141. Hart and Honor6 take the conventional line and cite United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Those of a less scientistic disposition may prefer the version in Conway
v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940):
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the
likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it
happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk. All these
are practically not susceptible of any quantitative estimate, and the second two are generally
not so, even theoretically.
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of damage. But much more important is the causal nature of "interest[s to
be] sacrifice[d] to avoid the risk."142 If a person could have prevented the
harm at all, then that person's conduct (or lack of conduct) must ex hy-
pothesi have "occasioned" the harm. Plainly it does not follow that the
negligence issue is the same as the cause-in-fact issue, since frequently a
cause-in-fact will not be "negligent." The defendant could have prevented
the harm, but at such great cost for so little prospective benefit that a
reasonable person would not have bothered.14 3 But nevertheless the fact
remains that a finding of negligence entails a finding of but-for cause. The
Hart and Honors contention supported by this argument is that the causal
minimalist conception of causation-that is, but-for cause alone-is too
trite to qualify as "the causation issue"; if there is to be such an "issue," it
must be something else. Indeed, the argument demonstrates that the mini-
malist position fails to dispense with causal issues, but instead merely con-
ceals them in other questions. Minimalists might welcome the implication
that the causation issue cannot be separated from the value-laden issue of
negligence, but the entanglement works both ways. If negligence presup-
poses causation, the former cannot be, as the minimalists have suggested,
vastly more important than the latter.
On the other hand, one need not agree with Hart and HonorS's belief
that there is a "real" causation issue somewhere beyond the issue of fault.
Instead, one might ask what conception of causation will sustain a partic-
ular notion of fault. This inquiry turns Epstein upside down. Rather than
asking "what can fault be if causation is central?" one asks "what can
causation be if fault is central?" A line of investigation arising from this
approach would consider whether strict liability and fault necessarily pre-
suppose different conceptions of causation. Fault, for example, suggests a
manipulative test under which cause is the same as ability to affect a situ-
ation or to prevent something. 44 This test, however, is not necessarily
appropriate for legal rules justified by "deep pocket" considerations, such
as strict liability for product-related harms without a state-of-the-art
defense.
A corollary of the argument that Learned Hand's form of negligence
142. Conway, 111 F.2d at 612.
143. Incidentally, this line of reasoning provides another justification for holding a defendant not
liable when a coincidence "overtakes" the result of the defendant's conduct-for example, where X
carelessly sets fire to Y's house under circumstances where the fire would normally burn down the
house, but the house is instead destroyed by a disastrous flood. What would X have had to do to
prevent damage other than the minor damage done to the doomed house before the flood? See CAUSA-
TION at 179-81, 245-49; Wright, supra note 2, at 1794-803.
144. Cf. CAUSATION at 35-36, 300 (cause identifies points at which public pressure or policy may
affect results); R. COLLINGWOOD, AN ESSAY IN METAPHYSICS (1940); see also Cohen, Field Theory
and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950) (similar idea that "cause" identifies pressure
points-places where action could be taken effectively); Calabresi, supra note 13 (same).
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presupposes causation is that in simultaneous cause problems (the three
house fire problem, for instance), the court must be holding the defendants
to a higher standard of care than normal. To have prevented the damage
from the conflagration, each defendant would have had to anticipate and
prevent the other's fire, or at least have taken steps to prevent its
spread.1 45 The only way to avoid this conclusion is to see the outcomes as
imposing liability without fault in simultaneous cause cases, or at most,
imposing a sort of hypothetical negligence in which the relevant cost of
avoidance is ordinary avoidance cost, not actual cost.
Again, the point does not apply to strict liability torts, nor to breach of
statutory duty, at least in England and in negligence per se states. If one
can be held liable even though it was impossible for one to have prevented
the damage, cause-in-fact becomes a separate issue again. 46 This in part
explains the difference between the license cases and common law negli-
gence.1 7 For in the former, unlike the latter, there can be a finding of
fault that does not entail cause-in-fact. Not having a license is wrong
whether or not it causes damage. Driving without keeping a proper look-
out may or may not be wrong depending on the consequences.
D. Burden of Proof
There is little to say about the fourth section of the mini-essay. It
makes some sensible, but unexceptional, comments about how the burden
of proof can be manipulated, as in simultaneous cause cases, such as Sum-
mers v. Tice,14' and res ipsa cases, such as Ybarra v. Spangard,49 to
produce strict liability where previously there was fault. It is perhaps
worth mentioning, however, that after a good deal of adverse comment, 150
and in order to take into account important cases, such as Sindell15' and
McGhee v. National Coal Board,52 the chapter in the book that deals
with evidence and procedure is greatly expanded.1 53 In response to the
145. This is a higher standard because it is generally harder to anticipate and control someone
else's behavior than to anticipate and control one's own.
146. Strictly, I suppose, the only harms that a person could not have prevented are ones that
occurred before that person was born-barring reincarnation-but since the information costs of om-
niscience, not to mention the transactions costs of omnipotence, are, to say the least, prohibitive, I
think we can ignore this as a quibble.
147. See supra note 110. Hart and HonorE incorrectly treat common law negligence and breach
of statutory duty cases as equivalent. See CAUSATION at lxiii.
148. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
149. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
150. See, e.g., Green, supra note 2, at 554 (Hart and Honor6 "do not keep in mind the necessities
of procedural apparatus"); Nokes, supra note 2, at 354 ("treatment of Evidence and Procedure is less
illuminating").
151. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
152. [19731 1 W.L.R. 1.
153. Compare CAUSATION at 406-30 with CAUSATION (1st ed.) at 364-80.
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specific criticism that the book was not very useful for (American) practi-
tioners because it failed to deal with judge-versus-jury issues,18 there is a
new section on that topic. 55 The additions, however, are not very enlight-
ening, at least for this non-practitioner. They do recommend a jury in-
struction along the lines of "did the defendant cause the harm or did
somebody or something else cause it," which perhaps shows overconfi-
dence in their own analysis. They also maintain remarkably conventional
views about the proper roles of judge (law) and jury (fact). The possibility
does not seem to occur to them that this division might be politically con-
troversial, as an attempt to limit lay participation in the administration of
justice. One cannot help but feel that half a century almost completely
devoid of the civil jury has left many English lawyers with an unduly
technocratic vision of law, and that calls for judges to adopt "ordinary
usage" are the remnants of a bygone way of deciding cases by jury.1
5 6
Such calls attempt to invoke the democratic legitimacy of "ordinariness"
without the inconvenience of allowing genuinely "ordinary" people to in-
terfere with the work of the professionals.
V. CONCLUSION-WHY CAUSATION?
Of the great number of questions I have left undiscussed, an exception-
ally important one remains, one with which I began. Even accepting Hart
and Honor6s version of causation, why should the law take note of it?
There are several answers to this question. The best known is one already
mentioned-Epstein's claim that causation is not merely an essential ele-
ment, but nearly the whole, of corrective justice.' 57 Another is Calabresi's
perhaps idiosyncratic suggestion that, whereas notions of increasing the
risk of harm are essential for a successful regulatory scheme, the only
justification for but-for cause is that it allows the courts to build up a
substitute for actuarial tables.15 David Fraser and I implied rather cyni-
cally that causal arguments allow courts to reach what they believe to be
the right results without having to go into potentially embarrassing ques-
tions about duties and valuation."'
Hart and Honor6 give sketches of two replies.'60 The first amounts to
154. See, e.g., Green, supra note 2, at 554 n.25; Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical
Case To Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TEx. L. REv. 423, 429 n.24 (1968).
155. CAUSATION at 428-30.
156. See generally Murphy & Rawlings, After the Ancien Regime: The Writing of Judgments in
the House of Lords 197911980 (pts. 1 & 2), 44 MOD. L. REv. 617 (1981), 45 MOD. L. REv. 34
(1982).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
158. See Calabresi, supra note 13, at 85.
159. See Fraser & Howarth, supra note 56, at 138, 166.
160. CAUSATION at lxxvii-lxxxi.
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saying that it is unfair to hold people liable for things over which they
had no personal control. But this is an argument not so much for causa-
tion as against strict liability. The second argument is that causation is an
essential element in the idea of individual human agency, and thus in our
view of ourselves as persons. On a practical level, this may overestimate
the importance of lawyers' language, and the law in general, for everyday
life. The lone benefit of lawyers' use of linguistic mystification is that it
sets a limit to the juridification161 of everything. The theoretical conse-
quences of these arguments remain to be settled. It would, at least, be
surprising if the idea of personhood was consistent with only one idea of
causation. Indeed, I doubt very much whether Hart and Honor6 are look-
ing for or would accept such a view. In outline, however, the argument is
very powerful.
It is independently interesting to see Causation in the Law adapting
just a little to the changes in intellectual fashion since 1959. It may be
that Hart and Honor6 have not kept up with these changes. Indeed they
may not have wanted to keep up with what often seems, from the eastern
side of the Atlantic, to be the obsession of United States torts theorists
with superficially attractive simplifying arguments, which, after being de-
nounced by the partisans of some other simplifying argument, seem inevi-
tably to end up more complex than the material they set out to sim-
plify.1 62 If, as I believe, there is an irreducible complexity in most
important problems, then a strategy which accepts complexity from the
start is more likely to avoid disaster than one which starts with impossible
simplifications. But the cost of such a strategy is the inevitable disappoint-
ment for those who seek "breakthroughs."
When it first appeared, Causation in the Law was hailed both as a
pioneering and a deeply conservative book. The second edition has a
wider vision than the first, reaching even to the metaphysical level that is
now approved Oxford philosophy. But it still refuses to follow fashion.
Tort scholarship in the United States veers from one universal solvent to
another (although they all seem to be coming from what, in European
terms, is the far right these days), but just as Hart and Honor6 refused to
believe that the topic of their book was next to nothing, so they now refuse
to believe that it is everything.
It may be that Hart and Honor6's particular proposals are open to
objections at many points, but, as I hope I have illustrated, the upshot of
these objections is not simplification but ever more complexity. In conse-
161. See, e.g., Clark, The Juridification of Industrial Relations: A Review Article, 14 INDUS.
L.J. 69 (1985).
162. Epstein's epicycles in his subsequent articles provide a good example of this. See supra note
8 (citing articles).
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quence, as they themselves conclude, it would be very foolish indeed either
to build a great edifice of law and politics solely on foundations of causa-
tion, or to believe that causation can contribute nothing at all to the stabil-
ity of those edifices that can be built. The authors' true contribution there-
fore lies not so much in their theorizing as in their attitude. They are
trying to confront their topic in all its intricacy. They refuse to simplify
just because the problem unsimplified is too hard for them. By referring to
ordinary language and common sense they may ultimately do nothing
more than repeat the problems. But at least the problems are stated. Their
'"common sense" is more than an outdated philosophical method. It is a
refusal to systemize for the sake of systematizing, or to evade problems for
the sake of some reductionist political program. In this sense, they advo-
cate common sense not so much as a clever solution to a difficult puzzle
but as a form of life.
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